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Raphaël Languillon-Aussel
Since the early 1990s and the collapse of Japan’s asset price bubble, developments in Marunouchi  
– Tokyo’s main business district – have revealed a turning point in planning policy with regard to  
commercial real estate. Instead of letting laissez-faire prevail, the public authorities have actively  
involved private developers such as Mitsubishi Jisho in order to increase functional diversity and  
redefine public spaces.
Marunouchi is the most central business district in the Tokyo urban area, located in the special 
ward of Chiyoda (also known as Chiyoda-ku1), between Tokyo Station and the Imperial Palace. 
Covering  a  total  area of  120 hectares  (300 acres),  it  is  home to some 4,000 businesses  with a 
combined worth  of  around  €1 trillion,2 or  over  20% of  Japan’s  gross  domestic  product  (GDP) 
(Mitsubishi  Real  Estate  2012).  As  Tokyo’s  and  Japan’s  main  business  centre,  the  area 
accommodates almost 230,000 workers in high-rise office blocks built over the last 30 years. Most 
of these towers and almost 40% of the land in the area belong to Mitsubishi Jisho,3 one of Japan’s 
biggest real-estate firms, which considers Marunouchi as its historic “fiefdom” since it completed 
its first developments there in the 1980s.
Map showing the locations of areas cited
© Raphaël Languillon-Aussel.
Legend: OMY  (secteur  d’étude)  =  OMY  (case-study  area);  Palais  Impérial  =  Imperial  Palace;
Gare de Tokyo = Tokyo Station; CBD de Shinjuku = Shinjuku CBD; Gare de Shibuya = Shibuya Station.
1 The suffix “-ku”  means  “special  ward”.  The 23  special  wards  (total  population:  9 million)  of  Tokyo  are  each 
administered as a separate municipality and together cover the heart of the Greater Tokyo area (total population : 
35–45 million).
2 ¥120 trillion according to June 2013 exchange rates.
3 Mitsubishi  Jisho  (Mitsubishi  Real  Estate)  is  one  of  Japan’s  major  property  developers,  and  one  of  the  main 
landowners in Tokyo. The firm plays a key role in the planning and development of the Yamanote (“high city”) area 
of Tokyo since the government sold off military land in 1890, in the vicinity of the Imperial Palace.
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Despite its centrality, the Otemachi–Marunouchi–Yurakucho (OMY) area experienced a major 
crisis following the bursting of the asset price bubble (1985–1991), which resulted in the area losing 
its competitive edge, with a slowdown in the expansion of office space and in Mitsubishi’s business 
activity overall. To respond to this unfavourable context at the turn of the 2000s, national and local 
urban renewal policies involving public and private players, orchestrated by developers such as 
Mitsubishi Jisho, were put into place. The various parties agreed upon a development scheme and 
renewal operations for public spaces in the area, with the aim of improving the competitiveness of 
this business district, in the face of increasing competition from elsewhere (Okada 2006). These 
renewal operations concern the office real-estate market, the diversification of economic functions 
and the redevelopment of public spaces for the benefit of their principal users: white-collar workers.
OMY is emblematic of a dual demotion typical of all central spaces in Japanese cities since the 
1990s: a local demotion due to increased intra-urban competition with the emergence of other, more 
recent centralities, such as Shinjuku in Tokyo, or following the redevelopment of other “fiefdoms” 
belonging to Mitsubishi’s rivals, such as Nihombashi, the historic “fiefdom” of Mitsui Fudôsan; and 
an international demotion in the face of booming Asian global cities – particularly in China – such 
as Hong Kong, Singapore and more recently Shanghai and Beijing, which in the 1990s became 
home to regional branches of foreign companies that were, until then, based in Tokyo. This dual 
demotion  of the OMY district explains  the somewhat exceptional nature of  the “urban renewal” 
policies that have been implemented in the area. OMY’s urban renewal is highly specific owing to 
its economic importance, the challenges in terms of international competitiveness to which it must 
rise, and the behaviour of Mitsubishi, which considers OMY to be its territory. These policies are 
nonetheless representative, at a more local level, of the policies implemented in Japanese downtown 
areas, where reinvigorating the urban fabric is one of the challenges of the overall revitalisation of 
the  real-estate  sector:  such  processes  involve  a  restructuring  of  the  supply of  office  space,  an 
improvement  in  the  quality  of  public  spaces  and  a  diversification  of  the  business  activities 
represented.  To  this  end,  the  highly  specific  nature  of  OMY’s  renaissance  operation  is 
complemented by more generic elements that are found in all Japanese urban centres experiencing 
similar problems.
The 2000s: making up for the lost decade
Tokyo’s office space was developed during two distinct periods: first, the 1970s and 1980s, which 
represent the start of the financialisation of the economy of Tokyo, which established itself during 
this  period as a major global city (Sassen 1991; Machimura 1992) and as the control centre of 
Japan’s national economy; and second, the 2000s and 2010s – the recovery years – which saw 
notable growth in the amount of office space available at a time when Japan was still experiencing a 
structural crisis and continued deflation. These two periods are separated by a decade of slowdown 
in terms of real-estate production – the 1990s, dubbed the “lost decade” by the Japanese media, 
during  which  prices  fell  by  almost  70%  in  central  areas.  The  urban  renaissance  policy  in 
Marunouchi implemented in the 2000s is the result of cooperation among a group of private players, 
in  partnership with the public  authorities (central  government,  Tokyo metropolitan government, 
Chiyoda ward council) within the context of the 2002 Urban Renaissance Special Measure Law.4 In 
Marunouchi, this policy, which aims to restructure the range of office space on offer and revitalise 
OMY, and Marunouchi in particular, is implemented for the most part by Mitsubishi Jisho, which 
4 The Urban Renaissance Special Measure Law was passed in 2002. It enables private companies to propose urban 
development plans to the local authorities, within the perimeter of a special zone defined by central government.  
Once the plan is accepted by the local authority, it is then examined by the central government (Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism), which approves it (or not) and provides a certain number of guarantees 
(financial, in particular).  Plans resulting from this law 2002 can therefore be considered an innovative form of  
public–private partnership.
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owns a third of the land in the area and 28 high-rise buildings; the future of the OMY area will  
therefore depend to a significant extent on Mitsubishi’s investment strategy.
Variation in land prices in the 23 special wards of central Tokyo
and macroeconomic context
Source: Mitsui Fudôsan, 2011.
Legend: 1985: Plaza Accord: forced appreciation of the yen; 1991: Gradual collapse of Japan’s asset 
price bubble; 1998: Asian financial crisis; 2002: Urban Renaissance Law; 2008: Subprime crisis.
From “Manhattan Project” to “ABLE City”: the transformation of Marunouchi
The renovation of the OMY area is far from simple with regard to the various plans that have 
been  proposed  since  the  1980s.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  a  long  process,  with  major 
transformations imposing changes to renovation plans between the 1980s and the latest projects in 
the 2000s – despite the relative stability of the central government’s urban policies (although it is  
true that the role played by the private sector increased between the two periods). In 1986, the 
Nakasone government  enacted the  Urban Renaissance Policy,  in  order  to  bring Japan out  of a 
decade of oil crises. The aim was to involve the private sector in the planning and development of 
central districts of Japanese cities, so as to revitalise the economy and improve public facilities and 
services. To achieve this, the law allowed for a special kind of zoning with more relaxed regulations 
(Shima et al. 2007).
In the 1980s, in response to the Nakasone law, Mitsubishi Jisho and its partners in Marunouchi 
had drawn up a redevelopment plan for the area, then called the “Manhattan Project”. This plan had 
the same aims as the 1986 law, but it also corresponded to a specific local context: for Mitsubishi, it 
was  a  case  of  reacting  to  the  Tokyo  metropolitan  government’s  1987  plan,  which  sought  to 
encourage polycentrism through the creation of secondary centres (fukutoshin in Japanese, literally 
“vice-centres”)  such  as  Shinjuku,  Shibuya,  Ueno  and  Odaiba,  which  would  rapidly  rival  and 
weaken OMY’s domination of the real-estate market for high-end office space. The “Manhattan” 
plan was therefore a kind of tacit alliance between Mitsubishi, the Chiyoda ward council and the 
central  government  against  the  Tokyo  metropolitan  government’s  political  agenda.  This  plan 
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included the construction of 60 towers, each 200 m high with a floor-area ratio (FAR)5 of 2,000 
(Shima  et al. 2007). This plan had two aims: to compete with the office space on offer in other 
central  areas  emerging  as  a  result  of  burgeoning  polycentrism;  and  to  remedy a  lack  of  new 
products in the OMY area, owing to a lack of land following the development of all available plots 
during the modernisation phase of the 1960s and 1970s.
Total office space and number of office blocks over 60 m high built per year 
in the 23 special wards of central Tokyo
Source: Nomura Research Institute, 2011. Graph: © Raphaël Languillon-Aussel.
Legend: Surfaces de bureau nouvellement construites (1 000 m²) = Brand-new office space (× 1 000 m²); 
Nombre de bâtiments = Number of buildings.
In order to make the “Manhattan” project a reality, a body had been created in 1988 (the year in 
which  the  project  was  launched),  namely  the  Otemachi–Marunouchi–Yurakucho  District 
Redevelopment Project Council. This body still exists, and in 2012 its members comprised some 70 
landowners in OMY (including Mitsubishi Real Estate), 17 observers and 9 special members. It is a 
private-sector  grouping  whose  aim  is  to  draft  redevelopment  plans  for  OMY (with  a  vision, 
directives and master plan). This council works in conjunction with an consultative body, created in 
1996,  called the Advisory Committee on Otemachi–Marunouchi–Yurakucho Area Development, 
which includes the OMY District Redevelopment Project Council, the Chiyoda ward council, the 
Tokyo metropolitan government and the East Japan Railway Company, which owns Tokyo Station 
(the city’s central railway station, located in Marunouchi). Despite the many different parties and 
structures involved, it is Mitsubishi Jisho that is in control of the redevelopment of Marunouchi and 
whose sheer economic weight means that public and private players follow in its wake.
5 The floor-area ratio (FAR) is a system introduced in Japan in 1963 with the revision of  the national  Building 
Standard Law, which governs construction in Japan. Although the height of buildings was limited to 31 m prior to 
1963, this height limitation was replaced thereafter by the FAR, a ratio of the total area of the building’s plot to the 
gross floor area (all floors combined) for all buildings on said plot.
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The Otemachi–Marunouchi–Yurakucho (OMY) district and the 
redevelopment project coordinated by Mitsubishi Real Estate
Source: Mitsubishi Real Estate, Annual Report, 2012. Map: © Raphaël Languillon-Aussel.
Legend: Bâtiments de Mitsubishi Jisho = Mitsubishi Jisho’s buildings; 
Construit avant 2000 = Built before 2000; Construit entre 2000 et 2009 = Built between 2000 and 2009;
Construit après 2010 ou en projet = Built after 2010 or planned;
Bâtiments d’une autre entreprise = Other companies’ buildings;
Construit avant les années 2000 = Built before the 2000s; En cours de construction = Under construction; 
Limite du secteur OMY = OMY district boundary;
Vers le Palais Impérial = Towards the Imperial Palace; Gare centrale de Tokyo = Tokyo Station.
The context in the 2000s was quite different. In response to a context of economic crisis and 
deflation promised for decades to come, a new law was passed in 2002 with the aim of boosting the 
renewal of business districts – the Urban Renaissance Special Measure Law. This law was based on 
the idea of special zoning, resulting in Urban Renaissance Urgent Development Areas (URUDAs, 
of which there are 63 in Japan, representing a total of 7,783 hectares/19,121 acres) and zones that 
were  even  more  attractive  to  the  private  sector  known  as  Special  Urban  Renaissance  Urgent 
Development Areas  (SURUDAs, of  which there 11 in  all,  covering 3,396 hectares/8,392 acres), 
including Marunouchi.  This zoning aims to facilitate urban renaissance operations promoted by 
private companies, as is the case in OMY with Mitsubishi Jisho’s plan. As in 1986, the law enables 
companies  to  propose  urban  redevelopment  plans,  normally  the  exclusive  prerogative  of  local 
authorities elsewhere. The relevant local authorities have six months to approve or refuse the plans 
and, in the case of a refusal, must provide a detailed justification for their decision. In the case of an  
approval,  the  plans  are  then  submitted  to  the  Ministry  of  Land,  Infrastructure,  Transport  and 
Tourism. Approval opens up a number of advantages: tax credits, preferential interest rates and a 
relaxation of planning constraints. The key criterion for approval is whether the plans submitted 
will contribute to the revitalisation of Japanese cities and offer users and visitors a certain number 
of benefits and services deemed to be in the public interest.
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Urban renaissance areas in Tokyo
Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructures, Transportation and Tourism, 2012. 
Map: © Raphaël Languillon-Aussel.
Legend: Principales  gares  de  la  Yamanote  =  Main  stations  on  the  Yamanote  line;  
Principales lignes ferroviaires JR = Main JR railway lines; Palais impérial = Imperial Palace.
In 2005,  in  the  “post-bubble”  context  of  the  2002 urban renaissance  law,  the  OMY  District 
Redevelopment Project Council headed by Mitsubishi proposed a new project, named “ABLE City” 
(“ABLE”  standing  for  “Amenity  Business  Life  Environment”).  This  project  differs  from  the 
“Manhattan  Project”,  which  never  came to  fruition,  and echoes  the  metropolitan  government’s 
desire to convert  the CBD (central  business district)  into an “ABC” (“amenity business core”), 
expressed  in  its  1997  Grand  Design  for  Central  Tokyo.  The  “ABLE City”  plan  shares  certain 
aspects of the metropolitan government’s vision for Tokyo, and also highlights four elements that 
contrast with the “Manhattan” plan: urban amenities, functional diversity, the district’s historical 
heritage,  and the environmental quality and earthquake resistance of buildings (Mitsubishi Real 
Estate 2012). The post-bubble, and subsequently post-crisis, context that gave rise to the 2002 law 
thus explains the shift from the “Manhattan” plan to the “ABLE City” project.
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Floor-area ratios (FARs) and revegetation in Marunouchi
© Raphaël Languillon-Aussel.
Legend: COS de 500 % = FAR of 500%; Dérégulation = Deregulation; COS de 700 % = FAR of 700%; 
Possibilité d’espace vert = Opportunity for green space.
In the “ABLE City” project, major efforts have been made with regard to pedestrianisation and 
revegetation, in particular at the base of buildings whose FARs have been increased in order to free 
up space on the ground in which to create gardens, public spaces and small-scale facilities (see 
diagram above). In addition, there is now a wider range of shops and restaurants on offer, with the 
dual aim of ensuring the area remains lively outside office hours and increasing its retail potential to 
extend beyond white-collar workers alone. Mitsubishi has also reconstituted previously lost heritage 
from scratch,  as  in  the case  of  the Mitsubishi  Ichigokan Building,  whose original  architecture, 
dating from 1894, was destroyed in 1968 to make way for a more functional building in 1971, 
which was in turn demolished in 2009 to make way for a complex combining the reconstituted 
Ichigokan building and the Marunouchi Park Building (see photo below).
Reconstituting historical heritage
In the foreground, the Ichigokan building, reconstituted on the basis of the 1894 model. Behind it, the 
new high-rise Marunouchi Park Building (2009; for more information, see 
here: http://www.isover.com/exportPdf/export/node_id/970/language/eng-GB).
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How successful has Marunouchi’s urban renaissance been?
As a result  of this  urban renaissance project,  bringing together private companies and public 
bodies, Marunouchi and the rest of the OMY area have experienced a profound transformation of 
their urban fabric and become more attractive. Nevertheless, the renaissance of Marunouchi also 
presents a certain number of limiting factors, not least of which has been the emergence of an 
oversupply of office space, leading to a recent rise vacancy rates, although vacancy rates in OMY 
remain lower than in Tokyo’s other vice-centres (Nomura Research Institute 2011).
And herein lies the key defect of the urban renaissance law, which resulted in all the major real-
estate development firms renovating their  respective “fiefdoms” (Mitsubishi in  OMY, Mitsui in 
Nihonbashi, Tokyû in Shibuya), leading to competition between the various renovated centres. This 
competition  has  generated  an  oversupply  of  office  space  that  the  market  cannot  absorb. 
Consequently, whereas the urban renaissance law sought to boost business districts by increasing 
land prices, it has had the perverse effect of increasing the volatility of prices from one year to the 
next, depending on the delivery of competing major private projects. Furthermore, one category in 
particular has been completely left out of the project: residents, for whom no new housing has been 
built. We see here the limitations of a renaissance process driven by a real-estate firm – Mitsubishi 
Jisho in this case – that is concerned only with office and retail space. At a time when Tokyo is  
seeing significant numbers of people move back into the city centre, this movement has benefited 
not OMY, or indeed other parts of Chiyoda ward, but rather the neighbouring wards of Minato and 
Chuo.
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